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Abstract
The industrialisation of agriculture has led to considerable alterations at both the
technological and economical levels of animal farming. Several animal welfare
issues of modern animal agriculture – e.g. stress and stereotypical behaviour – can
be traced back to the industrialised intensification of housing and numbers of
animals in production. Although these welfare issues dictate ethical criticism, it is
the claim of this article that such direct welfare issues are only the forefront of a
greater systemic ethical problem inherent to industrialisation. Consequently, this
article provides an analysis of the foundational ethical problems in animal
agriculture which derive from (I) overly positivistic science and (II) free-market
ideology. It will be argued that both these ways of thinking allow for a systematic
reification and commodification of animals and that this contributes to language
and attitudes which cannot encompass ethical consideration of animals.

Introduction
Industrialisation has dramatically changed the 10,000 year-old
agricultural basis of our civilisation. This unprecedented
transformation of the last 100-200 years is a well known and well
described phenomenon of agriculture in the Western world. From the
first combine harvesters in the 1830s to post-war modern tractors,
antibiotics and corporate business models, industrialisation has come
to dominate the mindset and practices of agriculture. A part of this
industrialisation is the development from traditional animal
husbandry to animal industry – a complex historical subject which
must, as a field of study draw on interdisciplinary research including
historical, political, sociological, technical and cultural studies. The
present article is an interdisciplinary philosophical investigation of
this development and its ethical ramifications. It is, as such, a
combinational analysis of industrial animal agriculture with an eye to
the histories of technology and economics.
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The expansion and standardisation of industrialised agriculture
is predominantly a post-WW2 occurrence but has its roots deep in
the industrialisation movement of the late 19th and early 20th
Centuries. Technological improvement together with economic and
social change interacted to bring about an agricultural revolution
parallel to – and to a great extent mimicking – the revolution in
production industries focusing on non-living products. Farmers
throughout the Western world adopted criteria and methods from
other types of production industries in order to stay competitive and
meet the demands (quantity, reliance, and price) of a continuously
growing market. Thus an almost paradigmatic agricultural shift has
taken place and its general resemblance to other industries has given
rise to the popular reference ‘factory farming’ – a manner of farming
that has had a severe negative side effect on the welfare of the ever
increasing animal population in agriculture (Fraser 2001, 181-182).
The direct animal welfare problems intrinsic to industrialised
agriculture are documented and discussed in a majority of the works
of modern animal ethics. Problems concerning confinement, social
isolation, overcrowding, lack of natural behaviour, stress during
transport and similar issues have been addressed in interdisciplinary
studies combining, especially, ethology and philosophy. Of course,
scientific advances and the general modernisation of agriculture have
also brought about better medical treatment of sick animals,
possibilities for better and more adequate feed and technology for
better winter housing (Fraser 2001; Sandøe and Christiansen 2008).
The presence of grave welfare problems is, however, indisputable and
this is of critical importance in animal ethics.
Nonetheless, the interest of the present article is to be found at a
different level. Rather than focus on individuals – animals as well as
humans – this article deals with some of the contexts in which these
individuals exist and function – i.e. the societal systems and
ideologies that form the foundation and social structures of modern
agriculture. Two of the main societal systems will be discussed: 1) the
scientific system as expressed in the adaptation and use of technology
and medicine in agriculture, and 2) the economic ideology as
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expressed in the adaptation and use of free market theory in
agriculture. With this background the text will take the form of a
philosophical criticism of the “de-animalisation” and
commodification of animals in modern industrial farming and of the
societal systems which promote it. As part of this aim, it will be
argued that the scientific and economic systems are incapable of
taking ethical values into account. The objectification of farm animals
is an example of this. Scientific and economic systems, in their
predominant forms, can only approach animals as objects and thus
the animals are no longer beings in relation to other beings, but
instead become part of machineries which, since they are objects, are
devoid of ethical relevance. The primary questions, in this context,
thus become: which aspects (or versions) of scientific and economic
systems debilitate the ethical consideration of farm animals in our
society, and how? From these questions it is the aim of this article to
argue that in order to approach and address ethical problems in
modern animal agriculture we have to not only direct our attention at
the individual levels (animal, farmer, consumer) but also necessarily
at the societal and political systems in which agriculture is inherently
embedded.
The article is structured in four parts. The first short section,
entitled ‘Industrialised animals,’ is a description and outline of the
principal functional aspects of industrialised animal agriculture.
Section two, entitled ‘Individualism, cost-benefit theory, and valuing
animal welfare,’ is an analysis of the application of free market
economy to animal farming. This entails an investigation into the
notion of value and its different definitions and the section will rely in
part on contemporary communitarian critiques of cost-benefit
theory. Section three, entitled ‘Science and technology – square pegs
in round holes,’ concerns the integration and use of scientific
methods and tools in modern animal agriculture. Here I address the
manner and extent to which technology has changed what the animal
is and its relation to the predominantly human world around it. This
section will further consider the mindset or ideology behind
traditional technological science and how this could have an effect on

135

the understanding of the animal. The fourth section, called ‘Things or
beings? The problem of ethics in industrialised animal agriculture,’
aims to show the connection between market-thinking and scientific
ideology – and it is contended that the scientific system and the
economic system are not merely linked and intertwined, but are
indeed two functions of the same way of objectificational thinking.
Lastly, in the conclusion it is argued that this institutionalised way of
thinking is detrimental to animal welfare in modern agriculture and
that a new inclusive community based approach is needed.

Industrialized Animals
There is no academic consensus as to the exact definition of
industrialised agriculture, but several supplementing, and to a certain
degree overlapping characteristics are usually employed. The overall
attribute is one of intensification (Fraser 2008, 167-189) which
subsequently connects to a number of different areas. In animal
agriculture this relates to an intensification of housing systems, i.e.
more animals on fewer square metres, increased indoor housing
systems and feed efficiency. It, furthermore, relates to intensification
in the amount of desired output, i.e. more muscle mass and quicker
growth in broilers and pigs, more milk from cows, and more eggs
from laying hens. Additionally, industrialisation is identified with an
intensification of agricultural management and farming culture. This
applies to a focus on monocultural farming where only one species is
kept – sometimes just during one phase of the animal’s life. It also
applies to farm ownership where increasingly larger farms (with
more animals) are owned by fewer farmers or, indeed, no farmers at
all in the case of agricultural productions run by corporations.
These aspects of intensification rely on a number of scientific
innovations that deserve mentioning. Firstly, medical science has had
a tremendous effect on both the possibility for and the running of
industrialised animal agriculture. The invention and prolific use of
antibiotics, vaccines, hormones and other medical technology has
been an advantage for the intensification of product output as well as
the intensification of housing systems. Medicine increases growth
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rates and enables the close quarter housing of the animals in systems
which otherwise make the animal population more susceptible to
diseases. Secondly, the technological advances in machinery have, in
another parallel to factories, replaced human labour. The animals in
industrial agriculture are increasingly both fed and monitored (and
cleaned up after) through the use of machines, thus dramatically
reducing the number of minutes the caretakers spend on each
animal.

Individualism, Cost-Benefit Theory, and Valuing Animal
Welfare
“Everything that has to be controlled has to be measurable. If it
cannot be measured, it is an illusion to think that it can be controlled.
And if it is measurable it can be priced” (Rasmussen 1993, my
translation).
The above quotation from the book “From Social State to
Minimal State” by Anders Fogh Rasmussen demonstrates the idea,
heavily inspired by the thoughts of John Locke and Robert Nozick,
that the best (Nozick would probably say ‘most fair’) way to run
society is through free-market capitalism. In Rasmussen’s case this
means that government and regulations should concern themselves
with measurable (quantifiable) things only. These things can then be
priced, i.e. valued in financial cost-benefit terminology. Such freemarket liberalism is, I contend, highly questionable in its endeavour
to encompass almost all aspects of our society – including
agriculture. The following section will endeavour to demonstrate
some of the problems inherent to these theories of laissez-faire
liberalism.
Traditional modern animal agriculture is an industry functioning
under many of the same parameters as other production industries.
Consequently, the influence of cost-benefit theory and the promotion
of free-market economy, which shape the conditions for the
manufacturing of clothes, diapers, toys, and furniture also shape the
conditions for producing animals. This is problematic due to a
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number of critical differences between animal agriculture and other
production industries. First and foremost, the products in agriculture
– unlike those in other industries – are complex sentient beings with
both intrinsic worth (or self-value) and relational ties to other beings
(Harfeld 2010). The claim here will be that such beings have value
that is not readily accessible through the cost-benefit epistemology of
free-market thinking. This is not to say that animals are not priced,
marketed, and sold like other goods, rather, the value of animals is
not limited to theses aspects.
Sagoff and ‘What is it Worth?’
An analogous assertion has been made by American philosopher
Mark Sagoff. His theory, although mainly applied specifically to
environmental issues, broadly explores public policy and societal
decision-making within areas where ethical values come into play
(Sagoff 1984; 2008). Several aspects of it can successfully be
employed to highlight problems of value judgement in cost-benefit
animal agriculture. Sagoff’s idea has developed around the concept of
the category mistake of traditional cost-benefit economics in its
assessment of values in the environment, in health care, and in other
public domains. Wall Street economics simply cannot take account of
the complexity or the nature of aesthetical, societal, and ethical
values that, although considered intangible from a financial point of
view, are at play when we evaluate and make decisions within the
public domain.
First, however, it is important to understand the main assertions
of Sagoff’s philosophical anthropology. He distinguishes between two
different roles according to which the inhabitants of any given society
are motivated and act. On the one hand, human beings can have
interests and act in ways that are purely individualistic. He calls this
the consumer side of us, and being such a person, one would
“concern [herself] with personal or self-regarding wants and
interests” (Sagoff 1989, 8). As a consumer, you act in accordance with
preferences that aim to help yourself or others, closely related. This
individualistic position stands in contrast to that of a citizen who is
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concerned not only with his own wants and interests but rather “with
the public interest” (Sagoff 1989). Being a citizen is what enables a
person to act out of concern for society as a whole. The point of
reference and concern is turned away from what I and those close to
me want, and instead I care about promoting the benefits of my
community independent of my individual wants. This is, for example,
the case, whenever someone supports and finances rights or interests
of a group of people to whom they do not themselves belong. As
citizens they might evaluate this as doing the right thing because it is
for the common good and they do this knowing that their actions
might have a negative or minimally positive effect on their personal
interests. Similarly, Sagoff sees the public protection of nature
preserves and wild animals as citizen actions, in which people
support things they consider valuable and do so irrespective of any
personal usage of said nature and animals. The consumer and the
citizen could also be meaningfully understood as two different
motivations for actions – the difference between wants and values.
Wants are readily accessible through the concepts of market prices
and cost-benefit calculations. The level of my wanting of object X
gives it a market value that is understandable in the economic
language. The price of object X is dependent upon how much one or
more individuals are willing to pay for it, which is again dependent
upon how much they want it. According to Sagoff the problem arises
when economic analysts attempt to value things within their market
theories that are radically different kinds of things. Cost-benefit
analysis can, through the wants of consumers, tell us something
about the monetary value or cost of, for example, a certain piece of
land. It could answer questions as to how much the land would sell
for or what it would cost to develop it, etc. This, however, does not
say much about the kinds of value that we actually ascribe to many
areas in our world – nor indeed to many objects and experiences.
Sagoff actually describes the difference between wanting and valuing
as the difference between things you value so much that you would
pay for them and things you value so much that you would not pay
for them. Value in the first sense is called price and value in the
second sense is called dignity (Sagoff 2008). To say that something

139

has dignity is to say that capturing it in cost-benefit terminology is
pointless and…
“… economic analysts who seek to find quasi-market prices for
citizen values […] commit what philosophers call a ‘category mistake.’
They ask objective convictions and beliefs a question that is
appropriate only for subjective wants and desires” (Sagoff 1989, 10).
Love, salvation, cultural legacies, natural wonders, and most of
the items on the UNESCO world heritage lists are but a few of the
many things whose value, according to Sagoff, would be impossible to
understand under the theories of a purely economic mindset. When a
person, as a consumer, declares his preference (or want) for the
music of Bach as opposed to the music of Mozart, he can only defend
this preference by way of personal taste. It is an appetite without
foundation in anything but self-regarding desire and the only level of
value is how much he would be willing to pay for it. If, on the other
hand, he acts as a citizen and declare his preference for the bird-rich
marshlands of Northern Europe he will, independently of his
personal willingness to pay a certain price for them, be expected to
argue for the value of these natural areas from a stand-point which is
not his alone. There is no possibility of arguing the reasons behind ‘I
like pineapple on my pizza’, but, Sagoff says, the discussion about the
values of, for example, natural habitats and environmental protection
are intrinsically accessible to all members of the community.
Sandel and the Consequences of Selling and Buying
A similar endeavour to distinguish between what you can price
and what you cannot is found in the writings of Harvard Philosopher
Michael J. Sandel. In his lectures and in the article What Money
Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Sandel 2000), he presents
a number of cases – e.g. surrogate motherhood and military service –
to exemplify the problematic expansion of commodification. It is a
criticism of what he sees as “the extension of markets and of marketoriented thinking to spheres of life once thought to lie beyond their
reach” (Sandel 2000, 93). There are, according to Sandel, two main
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objections against the ever increasing market-making of our lives:
coercion and corruption. The argument from coercion is what we
could call a background argument and it problematises the market
foundation of free agents by questioning how voluntary the actions of
these agents really are. If a given society is significantly unequal with
little or no distribution of wealth, situations can arise where people
are so disadvantaged that they will buy and sell under conditions
which could hardly be said to be voluntary in any real sense. If a
person, as Sandel describes, sells her organs in order to get money to
feed her starving children, it does not warrant labelling as voluntary
action. It is a market act due to the coercion of the situation and does
not live up to “the ideal of consent” (Sandel 2000, 94). This
argument, however, does not target markets and their proliferation
but is limited to criticising markets where the background inequality
reduces or prevents the truly voluntary actions of the participants. In
an entirely fair and equal society the argument from coercion would
have very little or nothing to say against an increased general
commodification.
The argument from corruption, on the other hand, focuses on the
very goods that are commodified and is independent of the equality
or inequality of a given society claiming that “certain things should
not be bought and sold” (Sandel 2000, 100) irrespective of the level
of coercion. The buying and selling of certain goods and practices
diminishes and corrupts the character of the goods and practices
themselves. One of Sandel’s examples is that of surrogate
motherhood – an ethical dilemma which has prompted even more
discussion since the practice has become global and outsourced to
developing countries as portrayed in the documentary Google Baby
(Frank 2009). Sandel argues that it is a wrongful (economic)
valuation of things like motherhood, fatherhood, and the nurturing of
children. These things or goods are indeed of great value although the
precise definition of their value is difficult to ascertain. What we do
know is that the valuation of motherhood “is different from knowing
how much the thing [e.g. motherhood] is worth. It involves a
qualitative, not just a quantitative judgment” (Sandel 2000, 101).
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These qualitative judgments are at the heart of Sandel’s argument
and if one accepts that some goods have qualitative value then it will
follow that these goods cannot be converted into a single measure or
unit of value.
In section four I will return to Sagoff’s and Sandel’s central
arguments to show how they pertain to animal agriculture: firstly, in
that cost-benefit analysis is inappropriate when dealing with things
whose value is not only assessable in money and secondly, that there
is a certain terminology inherent in cost-benefit thinking which
impedes ethical language and action.

Science and Technology — Square Pegs in Round
Holes
Parallel to the emergence and incorporation of free-market
economy into agriculture, the farming industry has enthusiastically
embraced the developments within science and technology during the
last 150 years – from the chilled plough of Jethro Wood to the most
recent pharmaceutical innovations. This means that animal
production not only functions within the same economic systems as
other production industries in society, it even functions via the same
tangible methods. The efficiency of assembly line technology together
with, especially, medical science has revolutionised the way that we
do agriculture as well as the way that it is indeed possible to do
agriculture. This, however, has not come about without consequences
for both the agricultural profession and the animals. The following
section aims to illustrate the background for some of these
consequences.
Feyerabend's Defence of Pluralism
The writings of Paul Feyerabend are notoriously provocative and
some of his claims have a problematic tendency towards an illfounded relativism. There are, however, a number of defendable
points in his theories, especially their defence of the pluralistic
mindset as a plausible counter-view to the natural scientific theories
which otherwise tend to dominate society. Feyerabend’s work is an
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attempt to problematise – and to a certain, but lesser, extent – to
illustrate a remedy for the suggested dogmatism in science. His initial
description of and argument against science and the “research
immanence of scientific standards” (Feyerabend 1980, 9) bear some
resemblance to Mary Midgley’s criticism of the “imperialistic
ideologies” of science (Midgley 2003, 21) as well as to Bernard E.
Rollin’s reproof of “scientific ideology” (Rollin 2006, 15-16) and the
excluding and overly positivistic definition of science and its
capacities.
“The common sense of science decrees that a wedge be driven
between the truths of science and the truths of ordinary life
…” (Rollin 1998, 6).
“This compartmentalization is inevitable and understandable,
but it is not necessarily beneficial ...” (Rollin 1998, 7).
Feyerabend’s description of the prevalent scientific community is
of a group or system so immersed in its own inner reasons and
foundations that it is no longer able to – nor does it seemingly want
to – break out of its paradigms, and thus: “Scientists are salesmen of
ideas and gadgets, they are not judges of Truth and
Falsehood” (Feyerabend 1980, 15). Both Feyerabend and Rollin argue
that science is continuously, and for the moment inescapably, caught
in its own net of presumptions. In particular, the still prevalent ideas
of positivism and materialism have added dimensions to science that
are limiting the scope of science and – because modern science is so
influential – limiting the scope of society. In other words, the
shortcomings of science are visible in the shortcomings of society and
its institutions in general.
In many ways the health care sciences are archetypes for such
criticism. Because of the underlying (dogmatic) materialistic
assumption of human health care as pertaining to “material
disturbances which can be localised and identified as to their chemico
-physiological nature,” (Feyerabend 1980, 16) health care has been
locked into a framework that is not unequivocally for the best of
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society or man. Examples of this are numerous in the mental health
care sciences, but are also found in more somatic diseases like cancer.
In a major report from 2006, the Danish Cancer Society (Kræftens
Bekæmpelse), the biggest funding organisation for cancer research in
Denmark, carried out a survey of 1,502 cancer patients and their
experiences with cancer treatment in the Danish health care system.
The report, entitled The World of the Cancer Patient (Grønvold
2006), concludes that cancer patients are not getting the optimal
treatment in the current system. It is, however, not the technical
skills of the doctors or the medical treatments of which the oncology
patients disapprove. The fundamental deficiencies in the treatment of
cancer patients are widely perceived, among the patients, as
deficiencies of care, compassion, and quality of life. In view of this,
the Danish Cancer Society recommended that new criteria be
developed, criteria that would more comprehensively describe the
core matter of optimal treatment. The problem is, of course, that such
new criteria would have to be based on the outcomes of the report
and therefore include concepts such as care, compassion, and quality
of life, which are difficult, if not impossible, to approach in a system
based on medical materialism and ruled by “body
plumbers” (Feyerabend 1980, 16). Feyerabend presents us with a
number of ideas for how to counter the rule of science, and he
especially emphasises a societal restructuring that he calls the
separation of state and science. Although it is not entirely clear what
Feyerabend means by this idea, it does rely heavily on one
component: a society with pluralistic structure and opinions.
This point is strongly influenced by the individualistic and
liberalistic theories of John Stuart Mill, who, in On Liberty, stresses
the notion of pluralism of thought.
“If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one
person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more
justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power,
would be justified in silencing mankind” (Mill 2003, 76).
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With Mill, Feyerabend argues that a “plurality of views is
preferable to a uniform intellectual climate” (Feyerabend 1980, 4)
because: 1) any opinion or thought, however seemingly insignificant,
can still hold truth; 2) even if the opinion is false, some parts of it
may still hold valuable truths; 3) a true opinion or thought which
goes uncontested by other thoughts will become unreflective
prejudice (dogma); 4) this slip into unfounded dogma – or “paradigm
blindness” as Rollin calls it (Rollin 2006, 258) – could lead to the loss
of meaning and prevent “the growth of any real and heartfelt
conviction” (Mill 2003, 116).
Thus equipped with a concept of constructive pluralism,
Feyerabend turns his attention to modern science, especially medical
science, and its dominant and atomising body-as-a-machine idea. He
uses what is normally referred to as “alternative” or “traditional”
medical practices to illustrate that many medical traditions have
existed and, indeed, continue to exist parallel to, but utterly
concealed by, the authoritarian and ill-reflective modern Western
medical science. Hopi, Chinese, and traditional African medical
traditions should be assessed together with modern medicine and,
importantly, this should be an assessment outside the parameters set
exclusively by any of the traditions – especially outside the dominant
medical science. Although Feyerabend is not entirely clear as to how
such an assessment should be conducted, he several times stresses
the argument from ‘results’ (Feyerabend 1980). In our investigation
of a seemingly foreign and “strange” medical practice, our assessment
of it must, to a large extent, come from the results that it produces –
both when it is independently evaluated and in comparison to other
medical practices. This, however, raises the question of the nature of
the results. Most actions, practices, traditions and so on, have some
kind of results. Therefore, what we are looking for in Feyerabend’s
assessment by results-comparison is some positive or ‘good’ result.
What counts as good or a traditional explication of ‘the good’ is
lacking in Feyerabend’s work, except that it is not necessarily
measurable in the materialistic terms of science. However, in an
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earlier article there is a glimpse of a value theory – an idea of what
our results should aspire to.
“... to make people more pleasant and more interesting, to make
life happier, to make the world better, to make the beer better, and so
on. These are all reasonable” (Feyerabend 1968, 130).
The broad scope and, admittedly, vagueness of this definition are
compelling aspects of Feyerabend’s theory. Because of the theory’s
focus on people and their lives as opposed to functions and workings
of a body, for example, it leads us back to our example from the
Danish cancer patient study. The grievances of the cancer patients
were with a system that, due to its intrinsic set of materialistic
parameters, could not incorporate treatment and results that are
aimed at the intangible choices and the holistic good of the patients.
The criticism that Feyerabend directs towards modern science
translates to a criticism of any dogmatic, monopolistic institution in
our society. It accentuates a justificational problem, pertaining to the
development of newer and better theories and traditions, as well as to
powerful institutions and their reign over and suppression of other
traditions of thought and opinion.
Rollin on Scientific Ideology
As shown earlier there is a close resemblance in some of the
criticisms that Rollin and Feyerabend direct at the scientific system
and community. Indeed, Rollin expresses gratitude for Feyerabend’s
“inspiring and pioneering work towards a realistic philosophy of
science” (Rollin 1986, 165) and uses arguments inspired by or
corresponding to those of Feyerabend both in the case of animal
consciousness (Rollin 1986, 165-171) and related to what he considers
natural science’s problematic dominance over our society (Rollin
1995b). Rollin, however, focuses his examination on the ideologies
that would withhold the relevance of ethics from the spheres of
science – and especially from the spheres of animal science. Where
Feyerabend’s objective is a review of science in general, Rollin
maintains an aim at the way science and scientific thinking has
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become a problem in our relationship with animals in research as
well as agriculture. This does not amount to a theory which is antiscience, but it should be taken as a “constructive critique of
questionable philosophical assumptions which underlie much of
current scientific activity” (Rollin 1998, xiii). According to Rollin,
these assumptions implicate arguments from logical positivism and
logical behaviourism and would thus undoubtedly exclude, among
many other things, the mental states of animals due to their alleged
unobservability. He argues, however, that such a narrow definition of
science would not only be at odds with “normal” common sense but
would make the scientific study of things like history and quantum
physics impossible since neither of these phenomena is directly
accessible or observable either. Rollin defends, in the case of animal
mentation, a type of critical anthropomorphism (Rollin 1998) in
which the qualities of the animal mind are asserted by a crossreference to species biology, evolutionary continuity, and common
sense. He sees the overemphasis on quantification in science as a
reductionism which ignores individual qualitative differences. This
tendency to look at quantifiable and repeatable functional systems
and disregard qualitative personal experiences is what leads some
“physicians to see patients as instances of disease rather than as
unique individuals” (Rollin 2006, 23) and to engage in
objectificational discourses about “the kidney in Room 407” (Rollin
2006, 141). Furthermore, Rollin questions the claim from the
scientific community that their work is, or should be, that of valuefree knowledge production.
“… as one scientist said to me, ‘We don’t make value judgments
in science; all we care about is knowledge’ ” (Rollin 2006, 22).
First of all, he maintains that science itself makes an epistemic
value claim when it contends that some types of knowledge gathering,
e.g. laboratory based empirical science, are better than other types
such as anecdotally based research. Secondly, he criticises what he
sees as a prevalent conception among scientists – namely that science
is ethics-free, i.e. scientific practice does not concern itself with moral
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matters only amoral facts and any ethical deliberation must, and can
only be, done in society outside science. Rollin, of course, does not
agree with this notion and maintains that there are no special
circumstances which insulate the world of scientific inquiry and
discovery from the effects and side effects that come about in its
wake. The world of science is not causally or functionally separated
from the beings – human and non-human alike – which are
positively or negatively affected by its numerous products and
methods, whether these are weapons, housing technology, or
medicine. One of Rollin’s primary examples of this is the emergence
and integration of antibiotics and other pharmaceuticals into
industrialised animal agriculture.
Whereas a nineteenth-century attempt to raise a hundred
thousand chickens in one building would have ended
abruptly with the deaths of the animals, technology gave
us antibiotics, vaccines, bacterins, and air-handling
systems, which allowed the animals to survive and
produce, while still experiencing severely truncated
welfare (Rollin and Benson 2004, 9).
The scientific discoveries and adaptations enable agriculture to
increase profitability and productivity by forcing “square pegs into
round holes” (Rollin 2006, 168) and thus circumventing the notion of
husbandry and its emphasis on “the ancient contract” (Rollin 2006,
8) and mutual benefits. It is important to understand that Rollin not
only criticises the concrete activities that potentially diminish animal
welfare, but directs his condemnation at the very mindset and (agri)
cultural change behind the actions. He sees it as a change from an
ancient symbiotic husbandry contract between the farm animal and
the farmer in which the animals were given protection from
predators, thirst, hunger, and illness in return for their products:
clothing, meat, eggs, milk etc. Animal welfare was at the heart of the
husbandry contract both from the perspective of practical production
– the notion that animals did not produce if they suffered – and its
focus on relations between a farmer and his animals, relations that go
beyond ownership and economic value. On the other hand, animal
science is, as Rollin puts it, “about efficiency and productivity” (Rollin
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and Benson 2004, 8) and its ideological agnosticism inhibits the
understanding of the animal as anything but an elaborate machine
and thus precludes any relational connection to the farmer.

Things or Beings? The Problem of Ethics in
Industrialized Animal Agriculture
The previous two sections emphasise two different potential
concerns in connection with animal agriculture: first, the valuation
problems of a free-market ideology, and second, the problem of
objectification and quantification in the scientific mindset.
Regarding the first, it is important to understand that neither
Sagoff nor Sandel, nor indeed this article, purvey an argument
against or a condemnation of markets per se. The buying and selling
of goods and services in markets is global, not only in the sense that it
goes beyond and across borders, but in that markets exist
everywhere. The question is how these markets are constituted. As far
as national or international markets go there is no such thing as an
entirely free market and the issue is to what degree a given market is
free or regulated. The market in itself is a mere mechanism, and as
such, an amoral thing. Similarly, some of the established regulations
are amoral tuning devices to make the market work
“better” (avoiding monopolies and increasing access). There are,
however, other regulations that are introduced, not in order to hone
the market mechanisms (they might even have an adverse effect on
the market) but in order to further something that has a value that
transcends the valuational competence of markets. It is the focal
point of Sagoff, Sandel, and this article that the idea and application
of market thinking and valuation has spread to areas where it is not a
competent judge and where its language of value is too poor to
capture anything meaningful.
Concerning the second point, that of objectification and
quantification in science, I must admit to a certain degree of
optimism. When Paul Feyerabend and Bernard Rollin began
challenging the established scientific ideas and methods back in the
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70s and 80s, the scientific community was perhaps more clearly
dominated by reductionism and materialism than it is today. When
Rollin in The Unheeded Cry, as well as in earlier writings describes
frequent meetings with scientists and veterinarians “who deny that
animals feel pain” (Rollin 1998, 23) and how he was himself,
educated in the tradition of positivistic “demand for empirical
verification of all meaningful claims” (Rollin 1998, 16) he illustrates a
different time in academia. One would be hard pressed, I believe, to
unearth scientists today who would actually deny the existence of
some kind of experiential inner world or mind of the so-called
“higher” animals (pigs, dogs, horses etc.) and that these faculties
include the ability to feel pain. This does not, on the other hand,
mean that science in general has moved away from positivism as the
only path to knowledge. There is still a widespread “epistemological
scepticism about animal minds built into the positivistic common
sense of science” (Rollin 1998, 24) but the battleground has moved
significantly throughout the last 20-30 years. The health and medical
sciences increasingly include life-style, social relations and a more
holistic view of the patients and the concept of health itself. Similarly,
the scientific quarrel in animal science is no longer about the
existence of animal consciousness or animal pain, but about the
qualitative aspects of that consciousness and about what different
kinds of suffering (or positive emotions) animals are capable of.
Researchers like Isabelle Veissier and Alain Boissy have ascribed such
diverse and complicated emotions as boredom and disgust to sheep
(Veissier et al. 2009) whereas these ascriptions would be considered
a step too far and problematically anthropomorphic by other
scientists (Wynne 2007). The objections of Feyerabend and Rollin
are, nonetheless, still appropriate to 1) the areas of science that
persist in using quantificational terms in answering questions which
are rightly qualitative in nature, and 2) the areas of industry, like
modern agriculture, where the scientific ideology has been adopted
and endures.
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Agricultural Business and Animal Life as an Object
I return now to the matter of market economy and its connection
to animal welfare in agricultural production. Some practices of
modern industrialised agriculture – e.g. crate confinement and lack
of behavioural opportunities – are detrimental to the well-being of
the farm animals. It is my claim that some of these practices are
supported by the free-market system’s way of thinking in which
agriculture has become so engulfed. This relies, first of all, on the
uncontroversial claim that there is a direct correlation between how
we perceive and understand phenomena in the world and the
attitudes and behaviour we exhibit toward these phenomena.
Roughly speaking, this is what happens when I see an apple and
decide to eat it. My perception of the apple and understanding of its
properties leads me to a certain attitude towards apples, i.e. that they
are things that I can eat and digest. I can, of course, be wrong about
this in many ways. In the case of an apple it could happen that the
object was a wax model and unfit for consumption – that would be a
mistake of identity. Or I could, in the case of another fruit or
vegetable, simply be wrong about its qualities – that is I could be
wrong about ascribing edibleness to poisonous yew berries. Similarly,
different ethical systems often have, as one of their foundations, a
theory to locate the parameters of ethical relevance by the
characteristics of beings. If, in the case of hedonistic ethics, a certain
being is understood as something which does not have the capability
for feeling pain and/or pleasure then this radically changes the types
of behaviour toward this ‘something’ opposed to the behaviour
towards a being which is understood to have such capabilities. When
Sandel asserts that the buying and selling of goods and services
corrupts said goods and services, he is guilty of a subtle but important
inaccuracy. That which is corrupted is not necessarily the goods and
services themselves but our perceptions, and thus, attitudes and
behaviours towards them. When we approach something as being
within the framework of cost-benefit economy, we are viewing it
through epistemological lenses that shape our understanding of it. In
modern animal agriculture, the free market establishes a certain
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value to a specific animal – or, in the case of meat production, a value
to a kilo of the specific animal. This value is strictly monetary and
reflects the amount of money that has been used in the production of
the animal (or a kilo of the animal) and the amount of money for
which this could be sold to retailers and consumers. This, however, is
a form of valuation better fitted to things like washing machines and
clothing whose value is not only external to the objects themselves,
but relies on their use and on the attitudes and behaviours of
individual consumers.
On the contrary, animals have value that is intrinsic to
themselves, i.e. they are ends-in-themselves (Regan 1985) and have
active lives and needs that matter (are of value) to them (Rollin 1992,
104; Dennett 1996, 4). Thus, a valuation which strives to understand
and appraise animals merely in the use-value terminology of the free
market is doomed to capture only instrumental and external aspects
– and consequently fails to take into account any other answers to the
question: what is the animal’s value? This is what Sagoff identifies as
the category mistake (Sagoff 1989, 10); it is a mistake about what
kinds of value we are talking and asking about – or as Sagoff’s prime
inspiration Immanuel Kant differentiates it:
Im Reiche der Zwecke hat alles entweder einen Preis, oder
eine Würde. Was einen Preis hat, an dessen Stelle kann
auch etwas anderes als Äquivalent gesetzt werden; was
dagegen über allen Preis erhaben ist, mithin kein
Äquivalent verstattet, das hat eine Würde (Kant 2004,
49).
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a
dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something
else as its equivalent; what on the other hand is above all
price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity
(author's translation).
This appropriately illustrates Sagoff’s point as to the evident
dissimilarity between different types of value and it is the claim of
both Sagoff and Sandel that, with respect to some instances of goods
and services, one type is correct and the other erroneous. This is a
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convincing claim as long as we remind ourselves that the focus
should be on the over-prevalent and wrongful use of cost-benefit
evaluation and not on asserting the intrinsic falseness of this kind of
evaluation altogether. Whether an evaluation of something is correct
cannot merely be intrinsic to that something, but must refer back to
the kind of question we are asking – whether its context is ethical,
economic, or aesthetic.
Thus, our first question must always be directed at the meaning
of the question: ‘what is it worth?’ This presents us with a very
pluralistic way of evaluating the world and the things and beings in it.
It is obvious that things, beings, goods, and services have a certain
monetary value in a society where these are bought and sold. The fact
that the selling of babies might be ethically wrong does not
necessarily connote that the monetary valuation of babies is a faulty
method within its own concept – its own question. There might be
very sound economic methods about how to economically appraise
babies. The problem is that the pluralistic evaluation of the world has
succumbed to a few, very powerful methodologies and ideologies.
Cost-benefit economics and free-market thinking are examples of
such ideologies which have, together with similar approaches (e.g.
narrow science as we will see later on), become bastions of power in
society. They have influenced the way we think about our world to
such a degree that they occasionally appear to be accepted as the only
real ways through which we can talk about the value of things around
us.
Returning to the question of the farm animal, we must recognise
that there is a plurality of ways to evaluate these beings and their
lives. Each of these ways is coherent and accurate in its own right
with respect to the context in which the question of value is asked. It
is apparent that pigs in agricultural production are sold and bought,
and through this price-valued. It is, however, not apparent that this is
the only or the correct way in which to evaluate these beings. The
evaluative questions and answers of free-market economics do not
provide us with the full knowledge spectrum of the animal’s value.

153

Indeed, the dominance of the economic perspective in agriculture
serves to blur the plurality of evaluations and diminish any applicable
ethical evaluation. This effectively undermines the ethical standing of
the animals and, by association, the welfare of the animals. This
undercutting of ethical standing is a by-product of cost-benefit
terminology and the way this terminology presents the world and its
content to us. When, as free-market theory would have it, goods and
services are exchangeable for an equivalent sum of money, it entails a
problematic uniformity on two levels. Firstly, it defines whatever is
thus exchanged as being the same as (or treatable as) other things,
since they are dealt with in the same manner (i.e. sold and bought).
Secondly, it defines whatever is exchanged as being convertible to
money. Both levels indicate a strong objectificational view of the
world – a view that can only understand entities in the world as
objects or things whose value is external to the entities themselves. In
our present line of inquiry this is what has come to be known as the
commodification of animals (Donovan 2006) and it is comparable to
the ‘Verdinglichung’ (literally ‘thing-making’) of Marxist theory or the
process which modern Marxist Ted Benton describes as reification.
“In this central dimension of our relation to non-human animals
[as consumers to commodities], they are subjected to an intensified
reification, a systematic exclusion from recognition as beings with
subjective life, or sentience, let alone interests or rights” (Benton
1993, 92).
This ‘exclusion from recognition’ necessarily entails that they
cannot be considered as beings within the sphere of ethical
consideration. Whatever a theoretical tradition holds as ethically
relevant subjects – Singer’s sentient beings, Regan’s “subject-of-a
life” (Regan 2004, 243) or Dennett’s beings whose being matters to
themselves (Dennett 1996, 4) – it almost certainly excludes mere
things. Inanimate objects such as chairs, pencils, houses etc. are of a
category of things in the world without direct ethical relevance. If cost
-benefit economy is a dominant mindset of modern agriculture then a
dominant mindset of modern agriculture lacks the ability to recognise
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anything as more than an object, and is thus predetermined to
classify animals as objects and outside the realm of ethics. This
classification is not simply another way of talking about animals
independent from and parallel with ethical evaluation. It is in reality
the negation of ethical evaluation in the sense that it establishes an
amoral terminology. The problem is not that the market terminology
is immoral – it is actually entirely oblivious to the concept of
morality.
Agriculture Science and Animal Life as a Machine
Another dominant mindset in society is derived from a certain
form of natural science and it is in many ways analogous to the way
that narrow, free-market economy approaches the world around us.
The Rollin metaphor describes the problem as making square pegs fit
in round holes. He argues that certain scientific and technological
actions are too focused on functions and become detrimental to
animal welfare because they increase the productivity of the animals
to such a degree that suffering is inevitable. However, science and
technology are not only problematic because they, under certain
circumstances, create welfare problems for the animals. Parallel to
my criticism of a cost-benefit evaluation approach to animals in
agriculture, I would contend that scientific terminology in a specific,
narrow-empirical version has been adopted by industrialised
agriculture in such a way that it seriously inhibits us from talking
about animal welfare in general and animal ethics specifically. The
problem has its roots in Descartes’ infamous concept of animals as
automata with reactions to stimuli but without corresponding
emotional states (Descartes 1912). In the dualistic philosophy of
Descartes this was the opposite of humans whose true essence lay in
the possession of an immaterial soul. The idea of automata-animals
continued seamlessly together with Lockean empiricism in the
positivistic natural sciences of the 20th century. Logical positivism
had its predominant philosophical influence in the first three decades
of the 20th century through the work of the Vienna Circle and its
associates. Although, proponents of a positivistic stance in the

155

philosophy of science started rejecting the theory again as early as the
late 1930s, the movement as such and Alfred Ayers book Language,
Truth and Logic (Ayer 1952, originally 1936) in particular, had
tremendous impact on an already very positivistic natural scientific
community. As Paul B. Thompson describes it:
The book may have served as a manifesto and a warrant
for two generations of budding scientists to return to their
empirical studies confident in the belief that not only
could they safely ignore the ministrations of theologians
and ethicists, but also that it was their duty as rigorous
scientists to do so (Scanes and Miranowski 2004, 339).
This has led to a “prohibition of ‘metaphysical’
language” (Schmid and Thompson 1999, 9) within the natural
sciences which is still detectable in contemporary terminology and
methodology. I do, however, agree with Thompson that the
willingness to include and undertake ethical justifications in the
agricultural sciences is entering a more favourable phase after having
been comparatively derailed throughout the later part of the 20th
century (Thompson 2002). Societal norms together with changing
public focus have supported a growing scientific inquiry in animal
science – and especially ethology – with emphasis on topics like
stress and welfare. These are notions that obviously fundamentally
elude any kind of logical positivistic scientific approach. Thus, the
accusation of unduly positivistic approaches to animal science is only
directed at the areas of science which still persist in their rejection (or
semi-rejection) of metaphysical and ethical language. I would
characterise this sort of constricted verification-heavy scientific
inquiry as a narrow science and it is, unfortunately, overwhelmingly
the methodology and ideology that has prevailed in practiced animal
agriculture. Thus, issues and problems in agricultural management
are addressed in terms of narrow science and by applying
corresponding technological solutions.
A serviceable example of such an approach is the welfaremeasurement system of the Danish Cattle Federation (DCF). This
system relies on a scheme developed by the DCF in order to make on
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farm welfare assessments for cattle, but in fact it only addresses a
number of different features which are only at best related to animal
welfare. The DCF assessment scheme focuses on “only the presence
or absence of illness, injuries and dirt” (Ingemann et al. 2009, 492)
and fails in this narrow scope to take into account the multitude of
different welfare relevant frustrations and positive emotions brought
on by other factors. There are, both in academia and in society in
general, many diverging and competing understandings of animal
welfare – but any concept within an agriculture influenced by narrow
science tends to exclude subjectivity and reify the animals into the
machinery of production. In this sense, the use of antibiotics and tail
docking is not related to the welfare or indeed the health of the
subjective animal, but is merely directed towards the proper function
and health of the animal as part of the material system. Exactly
because such a physicalistic world view lacks the metaphysical
language and facility to include concepts of intrinsic worth, it
becomes only a practical concern about function and output, whether
square holes are constructed for square pegs or square pegs altered to
fit in round holes. Like the cost-benefit economic mindset, narrow
science and its applied agricultural technology are trapped in
quantificational (and positivistic) ways of thinking that exclude them
from evaluations that lie outside the operational functionality of the
system. In this way, the scientists and farmers who claim that science
and technology have nothing to do with ethics are correct. Natural
science, in the narrow sense I defined, is correct in assuming that its
methodology is incapable of approaching ethical aspects or values
that lie outside the restricted quantificational understanding of
science. Its inherent methodology of inquiry and limited language
simply excludes it from finding any ethical wrongs (or rights) in the
world. This, however, does not mean that we should abandon narrow
science. It merely illustrates that narrow science has limitations that
prevent it from entering into ethical discourse and (partially) into the
welfare debate.
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Conclusion — Animals and Society
As two sides of the same coin, the examples of narrow science
and narrow cost-benefit economy demonstrate how reification and
amoralisation are inescapably part of their structure. An illustration
of this reification by language is the designation ’unit’ which equals
1,000 pounds of live animal weight. This labels cattle at
approximately one unit – whereas you would need nine animals to
have one unit of hog for slaughter and 455 animals to have one unit
of broiler chicken. When we characterise and talk about animals as
atomised units in a production system we impede any society driven
consideration focused on their subjective lives and we install
attitudes in handlers and ordinary citizens which are detrimental to
the animals’ welfare.
If we want to change this and take farm animal ethics seriously,
we must move beyond ethics of individuals and incorporate ethics of
communities, in other words: political philosophy. In order really to
assess animal welfare and to evaluate animal agriculture ethically the
questions asked cannot only be directed at individuals and their
actions and attitudes. It must also always be a matter of political
philosophy – i.e. addressing the situations and problems at the level
of communities, social structures, and politics. The focus of farm
animal ethics must continuously be a matter of the responsibilities
and actions of the persons – farmers, retailers, consumers – as they
make their choices in food production, sale, and purchase. However,
it is important to realise that these individual ‘ethical actors’ are
embedded in contexts and systems that in themselves can be
considered relevant ethical actors. It is along similar lines that Danish
philosopher Klemens Kappel argues for a combination of individual
and collective initiatives when we are faced with challenges whose
ethical structures are such that individual strategies alone would not
be effective (Det Etiske Råd 2010, 75-90). Animal agriculture is a
massive, worldwide, and omnipresent industry with strong
connections to national and international economies, politics, and
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science. Thus, it is exactly an ethical structure which calls for
collective strategies and political solutions.
Politically, the ethical dilemmas of animal agriculture could be
addressed in a number of ways but this article is focused on two
influences that I take to be especially problematic: 1) a political
philosophy which takes animal ethics seriously must reject a society
solely or excessively based on free-market economy and support
voluntary and involuntary regulations and economic constrictions
which promote an animal inclusive ‘triple bottom line’ for companies
and farms. 2) A political philosophy which takes animal ethics
seriously must also consider how to reduce the impact of narrow
science and technology in animal agriculture. This may prove to be
somewhat more complicated – albeit not necessarily more difficult –
than the political economic change. One tactic could be to increase
the support for research projects which include the metaphysical
language of welfare such as the EU project Welfare Quality®
(www.welfarequality.net) or institutions like official and universitybased animal ethics councils or institutional animal care and use
committees. The main focus, however, must be one of educational
politics. The emphasis on directing university education and research
towards the needs and wants of private businesses must be
abandoned, together with the positivism that fuels it. Overcoming the
narrow science ideology is a matter of changing a scientific culture –
a culture which has its roots firmly in the educational system of
universities. An animal conscious political philosophy must target
this and argue for politically supported information and education of
farmers and, especially, scientists and students.
“We can rest only when examination of ethical issues that are
presuppositional to and generated by science are as much second
nature to scientists as are the double helix or the Krebs cycle
…” (Rollin 2007, 48).
Primarily, however, animal agriculture must become a
community concern and as such be dealt with through public and
informed reflection in our society. If we concur that farm animals in
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our societies are ethically relevant beings, then this brings them onto
the political stage and inserts them into our common social order –
into our ethical community. This does not mean, as some anti-animal
rights advocates propose, that cows should be given the right to vote.
It does, however, mean that we, if we are acting as Sagoffian citizens,
must concern ourselves with the plight and lives of farm animals. As
individuals we can do this by investigating the vast and complex
workings of the agriculture and food industries and act upon our
knowledge when purchasing groceries. Yet, this individual strategy is
very limited in its scope when the ethical structure of the dilemmas is
on a systematic level in society.
One of the effects of modern industrialised animal agriculture
was the immense decrease in people working within the business. In
a few generations, technology, management techniques, and
economic conditions have vastly diminished the number of people
with either direct or indirect relations to agriculture and food
processing. This communal estrangement from a fundamental part of
our society means that knowledge about agriculture and farm animal
welfare is reserved to experts, investigative reporters, and very
inquisitive and persistent individuals. The answer to this must be a
strategy that is communal and based upon an adequate quantity and
quality of information gathered and guaranteed by the state as an
active arm of the community. Furthermore, the state must provide a
continuous public debate where access is not determined by the
political, social, or economic power wielded by the participants.
Lastly, even with a political philosophy working for animal
ethics, are we not faced with the predicament of all animal agriculture
being, by definition, an objectification and commodification of
animals? Even the most ethically attentive animal farmer keeps her
animals in order to turn them into things: pork chops, steaks, fried
drumsticks – and she probably barters with her neighbours
exchanging half a dozen eggs for a couple of pounds of ground beef.
These things are, of course, objectification and commodification at an
entirely different scale than industrialised agriculture, but it is
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objectification and commodification nonetheless. This is, however,
nothing extraordinary in our ethical deliberation. All people treat
each other as objects or means to an end from time to time, but this
only constitutes an ethical problem when these types of behaviours
are constant or prevalent and exclude the treatment of relevant
others as ends in themselves. As long as animal agriculture exists in
our societies, ethically conscientious citizens must engage and debate
this dichotomy between the commodification and intrinsic value of
farm animals.
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